The Rise in Terrorist Attacks
in the Western Sahara
The Mauritanian government is taking steps to prevent Al-Qaeda’s terrorist acts, including suicide
bombings and kidnappings in the region. Added to this threat are the explosives Al-Qaeda is able to obtain from landmines and unexploded ordnance scattered throughout the region after years of conflict in
Western Sahara. The United Nations Development Programme and various countries work to remove
these landmines and items of UXO, which is complicated by the lack of a Landmine Impact Survey.
by Lt. Colonel Mohamed Taghioullah Ould Nema [ Cabinet of the Mauritanian National Army ]
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Figure 1: Landmine Impact Survey costs available from reports found on http://www.sac-na.org.

spending more time and effort
on the initial data collection
could be useful. If the number
of false positives can be reduced,
it is reasonable to assume that
overall costs will also decrease.
The Expert Opinion Collection
is usually a relatively small part
of the overall survey cost, so investing more resources on accurately collecting data early in
the process may be a useful approach to improving the LIS
cost-benefit ratio.
Conclusion

The initial data collection in an
LIS designates communities as potentially impacted by mines and
UXO. Distinguishing between suspected positives and false positives
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early in the process can reduce the
costs of the LIS. Based on analysis
of the correlation between costs and
suspected positives, evidence supports that efficient planning can reduce future survey expenses.
Given the small number of countries that still require an LIS, the
outcome of this analysis can give
better cost estimates to potential donors and identify the survey parts
where savings are most probable
in the future. At this stage, with so
many Landmine Impact Surveys
completed worldwide, rewriting the
protocols is likely not useful. Focusing on more efficient implementation and collecting core data in
different countries is a better route
to cost savings overall.
see endnotes page 83
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n 2009, while driving toward the
French embassy in Nouakchott,
Mauritania, I suddenly encountered a large blast. As I approached
the scene, I saw the worst sight I have
ever seen—the results of a suicide
bombing explosion. A 20-year-old
man had blown himself up trying to
kill two innocent embassy staff members while they were exercising. The
explosion split the man’s corpse into
three parts: His head to stomach was
dismembered and lying in the center
of the path; his lower part was thrown
about 12 meters (13 yards) away; and
pieces of his legs and other small bits
were strewn about on the pavement.
He committed this action during the
daytime, in front of everyone, and I
saw it myself.
Immediately following the attack,
fear paralyzed the people nearby. No
one wanted to move because they
were shocked and revolted by the explosion, and they were worried about
additional attacks.

Al-Qaeda’s Terrorism in Mauritania

This was the first suicide bombing in the country and the beginning
of many Al-Qaeda el Maghreb Islámi
(Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb)
attacks in Mauritania. For example,

the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott
was blown up by a grenade and assaulted by terrorist fighters, wounding three people. Three French
tourists were killed at Aleg (in the
deep country). Finally, AQIM killed
French captive Michel Germaneau
in retaliation for a French raid that
killed six AQIM militants.1 AQIM
had kidnapped Michel Germaneau
in Niger on the border with Mali and
Algeria, but where he was killed remains unknown.1,2
The Mauritanian government is
determined to fight terrorists. Many
specialized units in counterterrorism are stationed on the borders between Algeria, Mauritania and Mali.
The soldiers comprising these units
were highly trained in counterterrorism techniques by American
and French experts. In addition, the
Mauritanian government essentially
provided all the needed equipment
to the units (e.g., helicopters, vehicles, radar, an armored personnel
carrier, night-vision goggles, etc.).
Using technology and satellite
data, Mauritania’s counterterrorism team is gathering accurate intelligence extending beyond the
country’s borders to stop the extremists before they can launch new at-

A sentry guards the approach
road to a lightly guarded Mauritanian Army munitions supply point.
All photos courtesy of John Stevens,
PM/WRA, U.S. Department of State.

tacks. A joint tactical-operational
center was created in Algeria. This
center provides updated intelligence
information, assesses the security
situation and coordinates shared actions against AQIM.
Other bandits, arms traffickers and drug dealers are located in
the same region as the AQIM fighters and can collaborate with them
in terms of resupply or equipment
support, although AQIM mem-
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Remnants-of-War and Minefield Removal

Mauritanian Army officers and an official from the NATO Maintenance and
Supply Agency, during an assessment
visit to one of Mauritania's remote and
lightly guarded munitions supply points.

bers govern all the military actions.
Many AQIM fighters are former
soldiers of Groupe Salafiste pour la
Prédication et le Combat (Algerian
Islamic insurgents). AQIM is building its capacities in many ways: It
recruits young people and trains
them through Islamist conditioning; it kidnaps hostages for ransom;
and it obtains weapons and ammunition from abandoned minefields
and fragile military camps.
Various arms and explosive remnants of war that can be utilizes illicitly are readily available to terrorists
in the Western Sahara region. This
area was a battlefield, and it has not
been cleared of the UXO. This means
AQIM and others can take advantage of this situation to resupply
their arms coffers. Moreover, many
government weapons stockpiles and
military bases are not built according to modern standards. Some of
these ammunition and light-weapon warehouses, therefore, are not
secure, and AQIM fighters could
conceivably penetrate them without
too much difficulty and obtain weapons from them.
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Mauritania’s humanitarian-demining office has cleared many
minefields since signing the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and
on their Destruction. More than
150,000 mines of various types
were removed, but the danger continues because many battlefields
from the Western Sahara have not
been cleared. Data is lacking about
the exact mine and UXO locations
since no comprehensive Landmine
Impact Survey has been completed in the region.3 Western Sahara
is contaminated following years of
Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia
el-Hamra and Río de Oro, or Frente POLISARIO) and the Morocco conflict. The UXO and mines
are especially prevalent along the
walls called “berms” created by Morocco to protect against the Frente
POLISARIO. In addition, terrorists
can easily reactivate some minefields
(marked areas that are not entirely cleared but have a small safe path
within them) by adding one or two
landmine strips to change the pattern. While military-camp security is very tight in the main towns,
the situation is far less secure in the
deep country, which makes it easy
for terrorists to obtain weapons.
The main mine-action actors are
the Mauritanian Army Engineering
Corps and a few Mauritanian nongovernmental organizations. The
United Nations Development Programme, Canada, the United States
and France have supported mineclearance and mine-risk education programs. However, the lack
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of accurate assessment and Technical Survey, coupled with a lack
of good management, have undermined Mauritania’s success in making its lands safe. As a result, mines
can still be found in many locations
along Mauritania's northern frontier and these weapons are used by
bombers, terrorists or arms traffickers, who can then sell these devices
to extremists.
The international community
must act quickly to help the greater
Western Sahara region solve this issue. Preventing terrorists from obtaining weapons and ammunition is
important. Strengthening and better securing warehouses, military
premises and camps where arms
and munitions are obtainable is
one solution; however, the government must also organize an awareness campaign about the danger of
these issues and train its personnel
to properly store and secure weapons
and ammunition.
see endnotes page 83
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